Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports Household by Alejandro Justiniano et al.
 
 
 
This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists 
and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are 
the responsibility of the authors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Reports 
 
 
Household Leveraging and Deleveraging 
 
 
Alejandro Justiniano 
Giorgio E. Primiceri 
Andrea Tambalotti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff Report No. 602 
March 2013 Household Leveraging and Deleveraging 
Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 602 
March 2013 
JEL classification: E21, E32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
U.S. households’ debt skyrocketed between 2000 and 2007, but has since been falling. This 
leveraging and deleveraging cycle cannot be accounted for by the liberalization and subsequent 
tightening of mortgage credit standards that occurred during the period. We base this conclusion 
on a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated using macroeconomic aggregates 
and microeconomic data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. From the perspective of the 
model, the credit cycle is more likely due to factors that impacted house prices more directly, thus 
affecting the availability of credit through a collateral channel. In either case, the macroeconomic 
consequences of leveraging and deleveraging are relatively minor because the responses of 
borrowers and lenders roughly wash out in the aggregate. 
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Figure 1.1. Mortgages-to-GDP ratio. Mortgages are deﬁned as home
mortgages from the balance sheet of U.S. households and nonproﬁt
organizations (Flow of Funds, Table B.100, line 33, unique identiﬁer
Z1/Z1/FL153165105.Q). They include loans made under home equity lines
of credit and home equity loans secured by junior liens.
1. introduction
The evolution of U.S. households’ debt since the turn of the XXI century has been
remarkable. As shown in ﬁgure 1.1, the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP rose by about 30
percentage points between 2000 and the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, three times more
than in the previous episode of credit expansion in the 1980s. Since then, this ratio has
fallen by about 10 percentage points, orders of magnitudes more than at any time since the
Great Depression. Here, and in the rest of the paper, we focus on mortgage debt because
it represents about 70 percent of total household liabilities in the United States, but the
picture would look very similar if we used a more comprehensive measure of household debt.
This unprecedented leveraging cycle has attracted a great deal of attention, contributing
to bring the connection between household debt and the macroeconomy front and center
in the public and academic debates (e.g. Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni, 2012, Midrigan and Philippon, 2011, Mian and Suﬁ , 2009 and 2011, Mian, RaoHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 2
and Suﬁ, 2012, IMF, 2012, and McKinsey Global Institute, 2012). In particular, Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012, EK hereafter) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012, GL hereafter) have
modeled the idea that a negative shock to consumers’ ability to borrow pushed the U.S.
economy against the zero lower bound, exacerbating the Great Recession and delaying the
recovery from it. This paper adds to this debate a quantitative perspective on the causes
and consequences of the exceptional leveraging cycle documented in ﬁgure 1.1. It does so
in the context of a general equilibrium model consistent with many empirical features of
the U.S. economy.
The model has three key ingredients. First, heterogeneity in households’ desire to save
generates borrowing and lending, and hence a role for debt. Since household debt in the
U.S. is held primarily in the form of mortgages, the second key feature of the model is
a collateral constraint that limits debt to a fraction of home values. As a consequence,
house prices play a crucial role in the dynamics of debt, a connection that is evident in
the data, but which is missing from the more stylized models of EK and GL. To highlight
the link between these two variables, ﬁgure 1.2 displays the historical evolution of house
prices and of the ratio between mortgages and the value of real estate. The massive boom
in home values that started in the late 1990s was matched by an increase in debt of similar
magnitude, so that the mortgage-to-real estate ratio remained roughly stable until 2006.
When house prices collapsed, this ratio spiked, since lenders cannot force the repayment of
outstanding mortgages, even if the value of the real estate collateralizing them falls. This
downward “stickiness” of mortgage debt is necessary to match the observed jump in the
mortgage-to-real estate ratio, and it is the third key ingredient of the model.
Both micro and macro data inform the model’s calibration. The Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) disciplines the degree of heterogeneity among households, while the Flow
of Funds provides information on debt and real estate values. For this calibration exercise,
we match the model’s steady state to the period of relative stability of the 1990s, because
the subsequent swings in debt and house prices are most naturally interpreted as large
deviations from such a steady state. The alternative strategy of calibrating to a pre-bust
steady state around 2006, which is common in the literature, seems hard to justify in
light of the pictures above. An advantage of our calibration approach is that it calls for
a comprehensive view of the recent credit cycle, encompassing both its leveraging and
deleveraging phases.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 3
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Figure 1.2. House prices are measured by the Real Home
Price Index calculated by Robert Shiller and available here:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls. Real estate is de-
ﬁned as the market value of real estate from the balance sheet of U.S.
households and nonproﬁt organizations (Flow of Funds, Table B.100, line 3,
unique identiﬁer Z1/Z1/FL155035005.Q). Mortgages are deﬁned as in Figure
1.1.
Our standard macroeconomic model, extended to incorporated borrowing and lending, is
a laboratory to study the quantitative importance of the mechanisms connecting household
debt and aggregate outcomes highlighted by the theoretical literature on deleveraging, and
in particular by EK. Within this broad objective, this paper focuses on the implications of
two main potential drivers of the leveraging cycle: a change in credit limits, for given house
values, and a change in house values, for a given credit limit. This distinction appears in
the model because houses collateralize borrowing, as they do in the data.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 4
This distinction is also important because it captures the two main narratives of the
credit boom and bust of the 2000s. These two stories have potentially very diﬀerent impli-
cations for our understanding of the root causes of the Great Recession and for the policies
that might avoid a repeat of a similar experience. According to the ﬁrst narrative, the
exogenous force behind the explosion of debt and its subsequent fall was a “credit liber-
alization” cycle—an overall loosening of lending standards that allowed more borrowing
against unchanged collateral values, followed by an abrupt retrenchment during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis (e.g. Mian and Suﬁ, 2009; Favara and Imbs, 2011). The second story sees the
boom and bust in house prices, driven by factors largely unrelated to credit availability, as
the main independent cause of the credit cycle (e.g. Shiller, 2007; Mian and Suﬁ, 2011;
Dynan, 2012). According to this “valuation” view, the appreciation of collateral due to the
steep rise in house prices facilitated more borrowing, even for given credit standards. And
when house prices collapsed, the credit cycle went in reverse.
We model the “liberalization” cycle as an exogenous increase in the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio on mortgage borrowing, followed by an abrupt return to its original level. This mod-
eling device captures one important dimension of the credit cycle observed in the U.S.
economy, which is the quantitative loosening and subsequent tightening of borrowing con-
straints at the intensive margin, as in most other macro work on the topic. To capture
the “valuation” story, instead, we engineer a run-up (and subsequent drop) in home prices
driven by a shock to households’ taste for housing services. This modeling approach cap-
tures the idea that collateral values were the main independent cause of the changes in
debt, and allows us to illustrate its implications, although it punts on the ultimate source
of the observed swing in house prices.
We draw three main conclusions from the experiments outlined above. First, the credit
liberalization cycle results in a counterfactual behavior of the debt variables. In particular,
debt increases far less than during the boom, while the debt-to-real estate ratio falls when
credit tightens, rather than spiking as documented earlier. The main reason for these two
counterfactual predictions is that house prices barely move in response to a mortgage market
liberalization, and its subsequent withdrawal. Therefore, the value of the collateral does not
rise during the credit expansion, failing to amplify the impulse of the initial liberalization.
And on the way down, house values do not fall enough to cause the spike in the debt-to-
collateral ratio observed in the data. This result is robust to a wide range of calibrationsHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 5
and is consistent with the ﬁndings of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Kiyotaki et al. (2010),
who show that shocks to LTV ratios have negligible eﬀects on house price dynamics.
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Our second conclusion is that the valuation story provides a much closer account of the
data on debt. The large increase in house prices that we engineer slackens the borrowing
constraint, driving debt higher. When house prices fall, collateral values plunge, but out-
standing debt does not fall by much, resulting in the spike in the debt-to-collateral ratio
observed in the data. The key source of this pattern is the asymmetry in the borrowing
constraint. This feature diﬀerentiates our model from most other models of collateralized
borrowing in the literature, in which the tightening of the constraint forces an abrupt con-
traction of the entire outstanding stock of debt (e.g. Boz and Mendoza, 2011; GL; Favilukis
et al., 2012, Garriga et al. 2012).
Finally, we ﬁnd that the aggregate macroeconomic consequences of the leveraging cycle
are relatively minor, regardless of its source. This is because borrowers and lenders react
in opposite ways to the shocks that cause the credit cycle. While not surprising in this
class of models, our contribution is to document that these responses roughly cancel out
quantitatively. Moreover, in our experiments, the nominal interest rate is always far from
the zero lower bound, which is the crucial ampliﬁcation mechanism of deleveraging shocks in
EK and GL. This is another dimension in which the asymmetry of the borrowing constraint
plays an important role. Without it, debt would fall more, and so would the interest rate,
to induce patient households to consume the resources no longer absorbed by the borrowers.
The presence of capital accumulation is another factor preventing a more dramatic fall in
interest rates, since an elastic investment demand cushions the impact of any given shock
to desired saving on the interest rate, as discussed by Christiano (2004). The role of these
realistic modeling ingredients in our results highlights the importance of an empirically
driven quantitative approach to modeling the leverage cycle and its consequences, and
makes us cast doubts on the common view that household deleveraging was a major driver
of the Great Recession and a crucial headwind in the slow recovery.
Of course, our ﬁndings are speciﬁc to the class of general equilibrium models we consider,
but they remain relevant to the extent that these models help to explore the connection
1Related to this point, the quantitative literature on collateral constraints that followed Kiyotaki and Moore
(1987) (e.g. Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004) showed that collateral values are a weak ampliﬁcation mechanism
of technology shocks. More recently, however, Liu, Wang and Zha (2011) reach opposite conclusions in the
context of a DSGE framework with a richer set of shocks.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 6
between household debt and the macroeconomy. One dimension along which the model
should be enriched is with the inclusion of “subprime” borrowers. According to Mian and
Suﬁ (2009), the newly acquired ability of these agents to access credit markets in the 2000s
was an important driver of the credit boom, and the main source of defaults during the
bust. Introducing this extensive margin of the liberalization cycle into the model is part of
our research agenda.
From a modeling standpoint, our paper follows the large literature on collateral con-
straints spawned by Kiyotaki and Moore (1987). More speciﬁcally, we follow Iacoviello
(2005) in assuming a dichotomy between borrowers and lenders based on their impatience,
as well as in the modeling of housing and mortgage debt. The particular form of the bor-
rowing constraint we adopt is inspired by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), although we
take more explicitly into account the asymmetry of mortgage contracts. Kiyotaki et al.
(2010), Mendoza (2010), Boz and Mendoza (2011), and Garriga et al. (2012) explore the
consequences of credit market liberalization in models with credit constrained households,
but do so in a small open economy setting with exogenous interest rates. Therefore, these
papers cannot address the role of the zero lower bound in propagating deleveraging shocks.
Favilukis et al. (2012) also consider a credit liberalization experiment in a rich general
equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk, but their focus is
on risk premia in the housing market. They ﬁnd that risk premia provide a powerful
propagation mechanism for changes in the availability of credit, a nexus from which our
model abstracts. Our focus on the role of household debt in the macroeconomy is closest
to EK and GL. Relative to these papers, our model features endogenous collateral values
that aﬀect households’ ability to borrow, a key feature of the data. In addition, we work
with a DSGE speciﬁcation closer to those normally used for estimation (e.g. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007), which also diﬀerentiates our
approach from Midrigan and Philippon (2011). Like us, they study both the leveraging
and deleveraging phase of the credit cycle. However, they focus on the eﬀects of liquidity
shocks, while we emphasize the importance of shocks to collateral values.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present the model and
its calibration. In section 4 we discuss the results of the two main experiments described
above, whose robustness is analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 7
2. Model
This section presents the quantitative model used to analyze the macroeconomic causes
and consequences of the boom and bust cycle of U.S. households’ debt in the 2000s. The
model builds on Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). The key assumption
is that households have heterogeneous desires to save, which generates borrowing and lend-
ing among them. Moreover, they own houses, which serve as collateral. This last feature
is motivated by the fact that mortgages represent by far the most important component of
U.S. households’ liabilities.
The economy is populated by four classes of agents: households, house producers, goods
producers, and a government. Their optimization problems and the market clearing condi-
tions are as follows.
2.1. Households. The economy is populated by a continuum of two types of households,
which diﬀer only by the rate at which they discount the future. Patient households are
denoted by l, since in equilibrium they are the ones saving and lending. They represent a
share 1     of the population. Their discount factor is l > b, where b is the discount
factor of the impatient borrowers. At time 0, representative household j = b;l maximizes
the utility function
E0
1 X
t=0
t
j
"
logCj;t + logHj;t   '
L
1+
j;t
1 + 
#
,
where Cj;t denotes consumption of non-durable goods, Lj;t is hours worked, and Hj;t is the
stock of houses. This speciﬁcation of the utility function assumes that the service ﬂow of
houses is proportional to (or a power function of) the stock. All variables are in per-capita
terms.
The utility maximization problem is subject to the nominal ﬂow budget constraint
PtCj;t + Ph
t j;t + PtIj;t + Rt 1Dj;t 1  Wj;tLj;t + Rk
tKj;t + j;t   PtTj;t + Dj;t:
In this expression, Pt and Ph
t are the prices of the consumption good and of houses, while
Rk
t and Wj;t are the nominal rental rates of capital and labor. The wage is indexed by j
because the labor input of the borrowers is not a perfect substitute for that of the savers.
Dj;t is the amount of one period nominal debt accumulated by the end of period t; and
carried into period t + 1, with gross nominal interest rate Rt. j;t is the share of proﬁtsHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 8
of the intermediate ﬁrms accruing to each household of type j and Tj;t are lump-sum taxes
and transfers from the government.
The stocks of houses and capital evolve according to the accumulation equations
Hj;t+1 = (1   h)Hj;t + j;t
Kj;t+1 = (1   k)Kj;t +

1   Sk

Ij;t
Ij;t 1

Ij;t;
where j;t is residential investment (i.e. new houses), Ij;t is investment in production
capital, and h and k are the rates of depreciation of the two stocks. The function Sk
captures the presence of adjustment costs in investment, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), and is parametrized as follows
(2.1) Sk (x) = k
1
2
(x   e)
2 ,
so that, in steady state, Sk = S0
k = 0 and S00
k = k > 0; where e is the economy’s growth
rate along the balanced growth path, further described below.
2.1.1. The borrowing limit. Households’ ability to borrow is limited by a collateral con-
straint, similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We model this constraint to mimic the
asymmetry of mortgage contracts. When home prices increase, households can reﬁnance
their loans and therefore borrow more against the higher value of the entire housing stock.
When prices fall, however, the lower collateral value leads to less lending against new
houses, but lenders cannot require faster repayment of the debt already outstanding. A
similar asymmetry applies when minimum loan-to-value ratios at origination increase or
decrease.
More formally, we write the the collateral constraint as
Dj;t   Dj;t =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
tPh
t Hj;t+1 if tPh
t  t 1Ph
t 1
(1   h)  Dj;t 1 + tPh
t j;t if tPh
t < t 1Ph
t 1:
If credit conditions ease and/or collateral values increase (i.e. tPh
t rises), households
can borrow up to a fraction t of the current value of their entire housing stock. This
is the standard formulation of the collateral constraint, which implicitly assumes that allHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 9
outstanding mortgages will be reﬁnanced to take advantage of the new, more favorable
conditions.
On the contrary, if tPh
t falls, households need not repay the outstanding balance on their
mortgage, over and above the repayment associated with the depreciation of the housing
stock (h).2 Therefore, the new less favorable credit conditions only apply to the ﬂow of new
mortgages, collateralized by the most recent house purchases. Besides being realistic, the
asymmetry built in this formulation of the collateral constraint is an important ingredient
in the results, because it allows the model to reproduce a sudden increase in the debt-to-
collateral ratio when house prices plunge, like in 2006/07.
Given their low desire to save, impatient households borrow from the patient in equilib-
rium. In fact, local to the steady state, they borrow as much as the collateral constraint
allows them to, and therefore, they choose not to hold any capital. Without the constraint,
they would borrow even more, so it is clearly not optimal for them to hold any asset. For
simplicity, we impose that borrowers do not accumulate capital also when the collateral
constraint does not bind away from the steady state, even if it might be optimal for them
to do so.
2.2. Goods producers. There is a continuum of intermediate ﬁrms indexed by i 2 [0;1],
each producing a good Yt (i), and a competitive ﬁnal good sector producing output Yt
according to
Yt =
 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+di
1+
:
Intermediate ﬁrms, which are owned by the lenders, operate the constant-return-to scale
production function
Yt (i) = A1 
t K
t (i)
h
( Lb;t (i))
 ((1    )Ll;t (i))
1 
i1 
  AtF.
They rent labor (of the two types) and capital on competitive markets paying Wb;t, Wl;t and
Rk
t. F represents a ﬁxed cost of production, and is chosen to ensure that steady state proﬁts
are zero. The labor augmenting technology factor At grows at rate . The intermediate
ﬁrms operate in monopolistically competitive markets and set their price Pt (i) subject to
a nominal friction as in Calvo (1983). A random set of ﬁrms of measure 1   p optimally
2This formulation assumes that the amortization rate of the mortgage coincides with the depreciation rate
of the housing stock. In section 5, we will allow for a higher amortization rate, so that households build
equity in their house over time, as in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009).HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 10
reset their price every period, subject to the demand for their product, while the remaining
p fraction of prices do not change.
An important reason for introducing nominal rigidities in this context is to have a mean-
ingful zero lower bound (ZLB) for nominal interest rates. The ZLB has clearly been a
relevant constraint for monetary policy in the last few years and it has been shown to be a
potentially crucial ampliﬁcation mechanism for the macroeconomic eﬀects of deleveraging
(e.g. EK and GL).
2.3. House producers. The production of new houses is undertaken by perfectly com-
petitive ﬁrms. They purchase an amount Ih
t of ﬁnal goods and use the technology
t =
 
1   Sh
 
Ih
t
Ih
t 1
!!
Ih
t
to transform them into houses, which are then sold to households. We adopt this decen-
tralization of the production of houses, rather than building the adjustment cost in the
accumulation equation, so as to have an explicit house price variable in the model.3 The
function Sh is parametrized as in equation (2.1), with elasticity parameter S00
h = h > 0.
This formulation of the production of houses is appealing for its simplicity, while still al-
lowing to parametrize the rigidity of housing supply.4 If h = 0, the supply of houses is
perfectly elastic, and their relative price is equal to one. As h increases, the supply of
houses becomes more and more rigid. The case of ﬁxed supply along the balanced growth
path corresponds to inﬁnite adjustment costs.
House producers maximize the expected discounted value of future proﬁts
E0
1 X
t=0
t
ll;t
h
Ph
t t   PtIh
t
i
,
where l;t is the marginal utility of income of the lenders, who are assumed to own these
ﬁrms. Since lenders are unconstrained in equilibrium, and thus always satisfy their Euler
equation, their discount factor is the one that pins down the steady state real interest rate.
Therefore, this ownership assumption would return the standard representative agent setup
in the limit with no impatient households.
3See Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti, 2011 for a similar argument with regards to the price of invest-
ment goods.
4Davis and Heatchote (2005) calibrate a multi-sector neo-classical model in which the production of houses
requires land and structures. They conclude that the presence of land (a quasi-ﬁxed factor in their model)
eﬀectively plays the role of an adjustment cost.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 11
2.4. Government and monetary policy. The government collects taxes, pays transfers,
consumes a fraction of ﬁnal output, and sets the nominal interest rate.
We assume that government spending is a constant fraction g of ﬁnal output, and that
the government balances it’s budget, i.e.
Gt = gYt =  Tb;t + (1    )Tl;t,
so that patient households can only lend to impatient households, and the net supply of
borrowing is 0. In addition, we assume that total taxes levied on borrowers represent a
constant share  of government spending
 Tb;t = Gt.
If  = 0, the entire tax burden is on the savers, while if  =   borrowers and savers pay
the same amount per-capita. Therefore, we can interpret the parameter  as capturing the
extent of government redistribution.
Monetary policy sets the short-term nominal interest rate based on the feedback rule
Rt
R
= max
8
<
:
1
R
;

Rt 1
R
R
" 
(t  t 1  t 2  t 3)
1=4

! 
Yt
ey
t
y
#1 R
9
=
;
,
where t is the gross rate of inﬂation,  is the Central Bank’s inﬂation target, and y
t is a
measure of trend output, which is computed as the DSGE approximation of the exponential
ﬁlter of log-output, as in Curdia, Ferrero, Ng, and Tambalotti (2011). The parameters R,
 and y capture the degree of inertia, and the strength of the interest rate reaction to the
deviations of annual inﬂation from the target and of output from trend.
2.5. Resource Constraint. The economy’s resource constraint is
Yt =  Cb;t + (1    )Cl;t + Ih
t +  Il;t + Gt;
where Il;t is the amount of per-capita investment undertaken by the lenders, who are the
only households accumulating capital. This constraint is obtained by aggregating the bud-
get constraints of borrowers and lenders with that of the Government, using the zero proﬁt
conditions of the competitive ﬁrms, the deﬁnition of proﬁts for the intermediate ﬁrms, andHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 12
Households
l
0:998
s
0:99
'
1

1
 
0:61
b
0:1
s
0:1

0:85
Production

0:005

0:5

0:3

0:2

0:75
h
0:003
k
0:025
k
2
h
1 or 600
Policy

1:005
R
0:8

2
y
0:125

0:55
g
0:175
Table 1. Parameter values.
the debt market clearing condition
0 =  Db;t + (1    )Dl;t:
3. Calibration
We parametrize the model so that its steady state matches some key statistics for the
period of relative stability of the 1990s. As mentioned in the introduction, choosing a later
period would be problematic, because the large swings in debt and house prices observed in
the 2000s are likely to represent large deviations from such a steady state. The calibration
is summarized in table 1 and is based on U.S. aggregate and micro data.
Time is in quarters. We set the Central Bank’s inﬂation target () equal to the average
gross rate of inﬂation (1.005, or 2% per year), and the growth rate of productivity in
steady state () to match average GDP growth (0:5%) during the 1990s. In steady state,
R = e
l . Therefore, we choose a value of 0:998 for the lenders’ discount factor (l),
to obtain an annualized steady state nominal interest rate of 4:9%, close to the average
Federal Funds Rate. For the borrowers’ discount factor (b) we pick a value of 0:99, so
that the relative impatience of the two groups is similar to that in Campbell and Hercowitz
(2009) and Krusell and Smith (1998). Since the size of the house price response to a credit
liberalization is somewhat sensitive to the value of b, we conduct some robustness checks
on this parameter in section 5. The labor disutility parameter (f) only aﬀects the scale of
the economy, so we normalize it to 1. We also pick a Frisch elasticity of labor supply (1=)
equal to 1. This value is a compromise between linear utility, which is typical in the Real
Business Cycle literature (Hansen, 1985), and the low elasticities of labor supply usually
estimated by labor economists and more common in the empirical DSGE literature.
We parametrize the degree of heterogeneity between borrowers and lenders using the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a triennial cross-sectional survey of the assetsHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 13
and liabilities of U.S. households. We identify the borrowers as the households that appear
to be liquidity constrained, namely those with liquid assets whose value is less than two
months of their total income. Following Kaplan and Violante (2012), we compute the value
of liquid assets as the sum of money market, checking, savings and call accounts, directly
held mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and T-Bills, net of credit card debt. We apply this
procedure to the 1992, 1995 and 1998 SCF, and obtain an average share of borrowers equal
to 61%, which directly pins down the parameter y. Given this split between borrowers and
savers, we set the production parameter  equal to 0:5 to match their relative labor income
(0:64) in the SCF. In addition, we choose the parameter controlling the progressivity of the
tax/transfer system to match the ratio of hours worked by borrowers and lenders (1:08).
This requires setting  = 0:55, which implies a moderate level of overall redistribution. The
resulting ratio between the total income of the borrowers and savers is 0:52, which is close
to that in the SCF (0:46).
The housing preference parameters , the depreciation of houses h and the initial loan-
to-value ratio () are chosen jointly to match three targets. The ﬁrst target is the real estate-
to-GDP ratio, which we estimate from Flow of Funds (FF) and NIPA data as the average
ratio between the market value of real estate of households and nonproﬁt organizations and
GDP (1:2). The second target is the debt-to-real estate ratio, for which we use FF data on
the average ratio between home mortgages and the market value of real estate of households
and nonproﬁt organizations (0:36). The third target is the ratio of residential investment
to GDP (4%). Hitting these targets requires h = 0:003, which is consistent with the low
end of the interval for the depreciation of houses in the Fixed Asset Tables, and  = 0:85,
which is in line with the cumulative loan-to-value ratio of ﬁrst time home buyers estimated
by Duca et al. (2011) for the 1990s.
On the production side, we follow standard practice and set the elasticity of the pro-
duction function  = 0:3, and the depreciation of productive capital (k) to 0.025. The
average net markup of intermediate ﬁrms () is 20%, which is in the middle of the range of
values used in the literature. We choose a value of 0.75 for the Calvo parameter (), which
is consistent with the evidence in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). For the second deriva-
tive of the investment adjustment cost function (k) we pick a value of 2, in line with the
estimates of Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent (2012). As for the adjustment cost parameter in
home production(h), we initially set it to inﬁnity, thus imposing a ﬁxed supply of housingHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 14
along the balanced growth path. The purpose of this extreme parametrization is to gener-
ate an upper bound on the variation in house prices produced in the “credit liberalization”
experiment. In the simulation of the “valuation” story, instead, we choose a lower value of
h, to match the increase in the residential investment-to-GDP ratio observed in the data
over the period 2000-2006.
We interpret G as the diﬀerence between GDP and the sum of consumption and invest-
ment, and set the G to Y steady state ratio equal to 0.175, as in the data. Finally, we
need to parametrize the monetary policy reaction function. In line with available empirical
estimates of the Taylor rule in the post-1984 period, we choose a considerable amount of
interest rate inertia (R = 0:8), a moderate reaction to the output gap (y = 0:125), and a
relatively strong reaction to inﬂation ( = 2).
The main results illustrated in the next section are robust to changes in most of these
parameter values. However, in section 5, we present alternative, more extreme parameteri-
zations of the model, and conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis.
4. Results
The calibrated model presented above is our laboratory to study the macroeconomic
consequences of changes in households’ ability to borrow. This study focuses on two exper-
iments, which are meant to shed light on the relative role of two potential sources of the
leveraging cycle. First, we exogenously perturb the tightness of the collateral constraint by
changing the required LTV ratio . The purpose of this exercise is to simulate the eﬀects of
a credit liberalization and its reversal. Second, we shock the consumers’ taste for housing
services to generate a swing in house prices similar to that observed in the data. This af-
fects households’ ability to borrow by changing collateral values. Although this experiment
uses a shortcut to generate the observed movements in house prices, it is useful to size the
potential of the valuation channel to generate realistic movements in household debt. To
preview the results, we ﬁnd that the “valuation” experiment generates the right quantitative
dynamics of debt over the credit cycle, while exogenous changes in the required LTV do
not. However, under both scenarios, the impact of household leveraging and deleveraging
on the macroeconomy is small, because borrowers and lenders respond in opposite ways to
the change in leverage, and these responses roughly cancel out quantitatively. Moreover,
in the deleveraging phase, the ZLB is never binding. These results are robust to a wideHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 15
range of calibrations, leading us to conclude that the basic macroeconomic framework with
borrowing and lending underlying our model is quantitatively inconsistent with the conven-
tional wisdom that sees deleveraging as the crucial force behind the Great Recession and
the slow recovery from it.
4.1. Mortgage market liberalization and its reversal. Our ﬁrst set of results comes
from a baseline experiment in which the borrowing constraint is ﬁrst loosened over several
periods, and then abruptly tightened. We generate these changes in the tightness of the
collateral constraint by varying —the initial LTV ratio of borrowers. Since  is a parameter
in the model, we refer to this variation as an “exogenous” shock to households’ ability to
borrow. As illustrated in ﬁgure 4.1a, we assume that the initial LTV on mortgages goes
from 0.85 in the initial steady state at the end of 1999, to 0.95 at its peak in 2006, and then
back to 0.85 by 2008. The evolution of  between 2000 and 2006 is perfectly foreseen by
agents after the initial surprise in 2000, but following this ﬁrst shock they assume that the
required LTV will settle at 0.95 after 2006, as shown by the dashed line. Therefore, agents
are surprised again in 2006, when  collapses back to 0.85 over the course of a little more
than one year. After the second shock in 2006, the rest of the path for  is again perfectly
anticipated and the model settles back down to its initial steady state.
We compute the response of the model’s endogenous variables to these changes in  by
solving the system of non-linear diﬀerence equations given by the ﬁrst order conditions
of the agents’ optimization problems and the market clearing conditions. The algorithm
used to solve this nonlinear forward-looking model is based on Julliard, Laxton, McAdam
and Pioro (1998), but has been modiﬁed to account for the asymmetry of the borrowing
constraint, and for the fact that this constraint is always tight in steady state, but binds
only occasionally during the transitions.
The movements in  fed into the model are calibrated to roughly match the evidence
on cumulative LTVs for ﬁrst time home buyers presented in Duca et al. (2011), which is
reproduced in ﬁgure 4.2. These authors’ calculations suggest that cumulative LTVs were
fairly stable around 85% during the 1980s and early 1990s, and started rising gradually
in the second half of the 1990s. LTVs then took oﬀ right around the turn of the century,
reaching a peak of almost 95% at the height of the boom, after which they fell back down to
90%. Computing cumulative LTVs for new borrowing is a complicated exercise, given the
available sources of data on mortgages, as also discussed by Duca at al. (2011). Therefore,HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 16
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Figure 4.1. Credit liberalization experiment: debt and macro variables.
we do not regard these calculations as deﬁnitive evidence on cumulative LTVs during this
period, an issue which has been amply debated in the literature. However, the work of
Duca et al. (2010 and 2011) is the most comprehensive source of data of this kind that
we are aware of, and it documents movements in  that seem plausible, if perhaps a bit
conservative. As a robustness check, we also consider an experiment with larger swings in
 in section 5.
The macroeconomic implications of the changes in  described above are depicted in
ﬁgure 4.1. House prices (panel b) barely move. In the baseline calibration, they rise
by about 2% in the “boom”, and then fall sharply back to their initial level once credit
tightens. The limited impact of changes in  on house prices is consistent with the ﬁndings
of Kiyotaki et al. (2010), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and Midrigan and Philippon (2011).
An intuitive reason for the muted response of house prices to a credit liberalization in our
model is the behavior of lenders. When the collateral constraint loosens, houses become
more valuable to the borrowers, who wish to buy more of them. However, this increase
in demand for houses is met by the lenders, who do not use their homes as collateralHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 17
Figure 4.2. Cumulative LTVs.
and thus value them less than the borrowers. Of course, in equilibrium, the valuation by
the two groups must be the same, since houses are homogenous, and this equalization of
marginal values is achieved precisely by some reallocation of houses from the lenders to
the borrowers. This reallocation increases the marginal utility of the housing stock in the
hand of the lenders, and decreases it for the borrowers, thus compensating for the higher
collateral value enjoyed by the latter. This margin of adjustment is independent from the
overall ﬂexibility of housing production, and remains operative even if the overall supply of
housing is ﬁxed, as in our baseline calibration.
What is the quantitative bite of this source of ﬂexibility in the housing supply faced by
the borrowers? This is important to verify, since one might doubt the empirical relevance
of this reallocation of the housing stock, as it is not clear that lenders sold many houses to
borrowers in the boom years. One simple approach to answering this question is to study a
small open economy version of our model, in which borrowers are the only domestic agents,
who therefore face a rigid supply of houses, as in a wide swath of literature on borrowing
constraints (i.e. Mendoza, 2010, Kiyotaki et al. 2010, Garriga et al. 2012). As we show
in section 5.2, house prices rise by more in the SOE speciﬁcation than in the baseline—
approximately 50 percent more—following the credit liberalization. This larger increase,
however, is still one order of magnitude smaller than in the data, which suggests that theHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 18
gist of our results is not overly sensitive to the elasticity of housing supply coming from the
lenders.
We now turn to the behavior of household debt in the liberalization experiment. In the
data, the ratio of mortgages to real estate is roughly stable in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, but
it spikes when house prices collapse. This spike reﬂects the asymmetric nature of mortgage
contracts: lenders cannot unilaterally reduce the value of outstanding debt, even when the
value of the collateral falls. This is how households end up “under water” on their mortgages,
owing more money than their house is worth. In the model, the evolution of debt-to-real
estate values is at odds with this evidence (panel c). The debt-to-collateral ratio rises by
about ﬁve percentage points during the expansionary phase and falls by somewhat less
when lending standards tighten in 2006. This behavior is a mechanical implication of the
hump-shaped path of , which makes people borrow more initially, and then less, against
the value of their house. The fact that the increase in leverage at the time of the ﬁnancial
liberalization is higher than the subsequent fall at the time of the tightening reﬂects the
asymmetry built into the borrowing constraint. However, this asymmetry is insuﬃcient to
generate the spike in the debt-to-collateral ratio seen in the data, because the fall in house
prices is too small in the model.
The debt-to-GDP ratio (panel d) rises until 2006 and then falls, roughly following the
evolution of the debt-to-collateral ratio. Qualitatively, this behavior is broadly consistent
with the data, but it is oﬀ in terms of magnitudes. In the data, the mortgages to GDP
ratio rises by 30 percentage points over the boom period, from about 45% in 2000, to 75%
at the peak, and the rise is gradual over these years. In the model, the increase is only 10
percentage points, and half of it happens on impact. In summary, the model does predict
an increase in debt in the early 2000s, as one would expect. However, the change in  alone
is insuﬃcient to generate a large enough boom in credit. The crucial missing link is the
unprecedented rise in house prices experienced by the U.S. economy, which the model is
unable to replicate.
Moving on now to more standard macroeconomic indicators, we see in ﬁgure 4.1e that
GDP increases for only one period after the liberalization, but then falls, while the opposite
happens when the constraint tightens. Panel f shows that the short-term nominal interest
rate rises ﬁrst, to encourage savers to lend more, and then falls when the LTV returns to
its original level. However, the nominal interest rate never reaches the ZLB in the baselineHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 19
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Figure 4.3. Credit liberalization experiment without the asymmetry of the
collateral constraint : debt and macro variables.
calibration, which is an important reason why the recession that follows the retrenchment
in  is short and shallow.
4.1.1. Asymmetric collateral constraints, capital investment, and the ZLB. The ZLB is an
important channel for the ampliﬁcation of deleveraging shocks, as emphasized by EK and
GL, but it does not bind in our model, largely due to the asymmetry of the borrowing
constraint. In simulations in which this asymmetry is ignored, as in most of the literature,
so that the tightening of the borrowing constraint also applies to the outstanding stock
of debt, the nominal interest rate falls much more than in the baseline, reaching a level
of 0.7%, as we show in ﬁgure 4.3. This ﬁgure also illustrates that the outstanding level
of debt declines sharply in this case, and generates a counterfactual collapse in both the
debt-to-GDP and the debt-to-collateral ratios. Finally the recession is much more severe
in this case, with GDP contracting by roughly 6%.
Another important factor that prevents a more dramatic fall of the interest rates is the
presence of capital accumulation, since the shift in desired saving triggered by changesHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 20
in agents’ ability to borrow happens along an elastic demand for investment, rather than
against a ﬁxed supply of assets as in models with no capital (Christiano, 2004). For ex-
ample, if we were to ignore not only the asymmetry of the collateral constraint, but also
capital accumulation—which we shut down by jacking up the investment adjustment costs—
interest rates would hit the ZLB in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007, and the economy would fall in
a liquidity trap.
4.1.2. The interaction of borrowers and lenders. We now go back to our baseline experiment
and seek to gain further insight into how the interaction between borrowers and savers
shapes the behavior of the macroeconomy following an exogenous change in households’
ability to borrow. To this end, ﬁgure 4.4 reports the evolution of consumption, the housing
stock and hours worked for borrowers and lenders separately. Borrowers increase their
consumption of non-durables, houses and leisure following the increase in , and curtail
them when  falls. Intuitively, a looser borrowing constraint allows them to get closer to
satisfying the desire for early consumption dictated by their relative impatience. In fact,
the borrowing constraint does not bind for several periods after the initial shock, although
the fact that the constraint will bind again in the future continues to aﬀect their current
behavior, as emphasized for instance by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2012). On the other side
of the ledger, lenders need to mobilize the extra resources consumed by the borrowers. They
do so in response to a higher interest rate, which induces them to consume less, sell part of
their housing stock, reduce their accumulation of capital, and work harder. Quantitatively,
the eﬀects are large for each class of agents, but roughly oﬀset each other in the aggregate.
As a result, the eﬀects of the credit liberalization cycle on the macroeconomy are fairly
muted.
Together with the counterfactual evolution of house prices and of the debt-to-GDP ratio,
which move way too little, and of the debt-to-real estate ratio, which goes in the wrong
direction, these results are the basis for the conclusion that exogenous shifts in credit avail-
ability to existing borrowers are unlikely to be an important driver of the macroeconomic
outcomes observed during the credit boom and bust of the 2000s. Another key observation
is that, in the data, house prices stabilized and then started to fall in the second quarter
of 2006. This date precedes the turmoil in ﬁnancial markets that caused the tightening inHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 21
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Figure 4.4. Credit liberalization experiment: borrowers and lenders.
credit standards, at least according to the data on the “Net Percentage of Domestic Respon-
dents Tightening Standards for Residential Mortgage Loans,” in the “Senior Loan Oﬃcer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices” conducted by the Federal Reserve Board and
available on their website. This observation represents an additional challenge to the hy-
pothesis that an exogenous reversal of mortgage markets deregulation was the main trigger
of households’ deleveraging, and motivates the exploration of the “valuation” view of the
credit cycle illustrated in the next section.
4.2. A shock to home prices. The results presented above cast doubts on a strong
connection between the process of credit liberalization and large movements in house prices
of the kind observed during the 2000s. And without these movements, it is diﬃcult to
reproduce the observed evolution of debt and leverage. As an alternative, this subsection
explores a scenario in which the ﬂuctuations in house prices are driven by independent
factors, unrelated to changes in credit conditions, consistent with the hypothesis that the
evolution of collateral values might have been the primary engine behind the credit boomHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 22
and bust. The objective of this experiment is to investigate the transmission of “valuation”
shocks and their potential to generate a credit cycle with the right empirical features, rather
than to shed light on the underlying factors that led to the observed swings in house prices.
To this end, we engineer a large cycle in house prices, which mimics the one observed
in the data, by shocking the households’ preference for housing services. Although we do
not regard taste shocks as the primitive driver of price dynamics in the data, they are an
essential device to generate empirically plausible movements in collateral values in most
DSGE models with housing.5 Figure 4.5 presents the results of this experiment. Prices rise
by more than 50% between 2000 and 2006, and drop abruptly after that, as shown in the
ﬁrst panel of the ﬁgure.
The consequences of this large swing in house prices are depicted in the remaining panels
of ﬁgure 4.5. Overall, these simulations are much more consistent with the data than those
obtained by perturbing the initial LTV : First, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises steadily, from
0.45 in 2000 to 0.7 at the peak, and subsequently falls by 5 to 10 percentage points, just as
in the data. Similarly, the debt-to-real estate ratio is fairly stable during the boom, spikes
when house prices plunge and subsequently declines somewhat. An important contributor
to this behavior of the debt-to-collateral ratio, which rose signiﬁcantly during the great
deleveraging, is the asymmetry of the collateral constraint, which is modeled to account for
the empirical fact that mortgage principals are ﬁxed in nominal terms, but the value of the
underlying collateral can change abruptly.
Compared to the eﬀects on the debt variables, those on GDP are much smaller in this
experiment, and overall quite similar to those under the credit liberalization scenario. As in
that case, the reason for the muted aggregate impact of the credit boom and bust is that the
two sets of households behave in opposite ways. During the credit boom, borrowers consume
more, accumulate more houses and work less, while lenders cut their consumption, sell
some of their houses, reduce their accumulation of capital, and work harder. The opposite
happens during the bust. As a result, GDP falls in the ﬁrst two years of the simulation,
after rising slightly on impact, but then recovers through 2008, and falls somewhat once
house prices collapse. The initial behavior is qualitatively consistent with the evolution of
GDP in the data, although we would not go as far as claiming that the the recession of 2001
5See in particular Iacoviello and Neri (2010), who also present some evidence on the extent to which taste
shocks might in fact be considered “structural.” Liu at al. (2012) reach similar conclusions in a model in
which ﬁrms use land as collateral.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 23
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Figure 4.5. Valuation experiment: debt and macro variables
and the sluggish recovery that followed were caused by the housing boom to come. What
is clearly counterfactual, also in this experiment, is the behavior of the nominal interest
rate, which hovers between 5 and 6 percent, while it was considerably lower in the data.
Studying more closely the reasons for this discrepancy between the interest rate predicted
by the model and that observed in practice is an interesting topic for future research.
More in general, the results of this experiment are subject to the caveat that the demand
shock driving the price of houses represents a change in fundamentals with many eﬀects
on the equilibrium behavior of economic agents, rather than a clean, exogenous impulse
to collateral values alone. For this reason, we see these results as merely suggestive of
the potential for the collateral channel to produce a credit cycle consistent with the one
observed in the data.
5. Sensitivity and Extensions
In this section, we show that the results on the eﬀects of a credit liberalization cycle
illustrated in section 4.1 are robust both to alternative calibrations of the key parametersHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 24
of the model, and to a modiﬁcation of the framework to allow the economy to borrow from
the rest of the world.
5.1. Alternative calibrations. We start by considering an alternative calibration in which
borrowers are more impatient, and thus might respond more aggressively to a loosening of
the credit constraint. We then analyze the eﬀects of credit liberalization cycles of larger
magnitude. More speciﬁcally, we perform the following experiments:
(1) Greater borrower impatience (Lower b). We set the discount factor of the
borrowers (b) to 0:98, and analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the LTV from 0.85
to 0.95, like in the baseline.
(2) Larger change in LTV (Lower initial ). We set the initial  equal to 0.75 and
let it rise to 0.95, before letting it fall back to its pre-liberalization value. This
experiment doubles the variation of the LTV relative to the baseline.
(3) Combined liberalization (Change in  and %). To capture the emergence of
mortgages with lower amortization rates, such as interest-only mortgages, during
the housing boom, we assume that the credit liberalization also entails a slower
repayment of existing loans, in addition to a higher initial LTV. To incorporate this
consideration, we modify the borrowing constraint of section 2 to allow for the loan
repayment rate to diﬀer from the depreciation rate of the collateral, as in Campbell
and Hercowitz (2009). The borrowing constraint therefore becomes
Dj;t   Dj;t =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
tPh
t
P 1
i=0(1   %)ij;t i if tPh
t  t 1Ph
t 1
(1   %)  Dj;t 1 + tPh
t j;t if tPh
t < t 1Ph
t 1;
where % denotes the amortization rate of the loan. We set the initial amortization
rate to 0.006 (two times the baseline value), and simulate the eﬀects of a combined
transition of  from 0.85 to 0.95, and of % from 0.006 to 0.003. After 6 years, as 
reverts to its original level, the amortization rate also returns to 0.006.
(4) Simultaneous Changes (All). We combine the previous three experiments. Withb
equal to 0.98, we analyze the eﬀects of a simultaneous change of  from 0.75 to 0.95
and of % from 0.006 to 0.003, together with its reversal.HOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 25
Parameter Description Baseline Lower b
Lower
initial 
Change
in  and % All
b Discount factor, borrower .99 .98 U U .98
 Initial LTV .85 U .75 U .75
% Amortization rate .003 U U .006 .006
b Housing preference, borrower .1 .114 .12 .15 .23
l Housing preference, lender .1 .1 .09 .07 .06
Table 2. Baseline and alternative model parameterizations. “U” means
unchanged relative to the baseline.
The parameter values in these alternative experiments are summarized in table 2. Compared
to the baseline, we allow for diﬀerent housing preference parameters for borrowers and
lenders (b and l) and let them vary across experiments. This modiﬁcation is necessary to
match the steady state targets discussed in section 3, i.e. the ratios of debt to real estate,
real estate to GDP and residential investment to GDP.
Figure 5.1 presents the eﬀects of a credit liberalization cycle in the baseline calibration
and in the four alternatives described above. To facilitate comparisons, house prices and
GDP have been normalized to 100 in the initial steady state. Consider the ﬁrst three
experiments, which diﬀer from the baseline for the value of a single parameter. Panels
b, c and d show that they all boost the response of debt and house prices relative to the
baseline. However, the movements of these variables remain an order of magnitude smaller
than in the data, or plainly at odds with them, as for the debt-to-collateral ratio.
Not surprisingly, the results are closest to the evidence in the last experiment, which
combines all the parameter changes. The cycle in house prices is more pronounced than
in the baseline, with a maximum appreciation of about 20 percent. As a consequence, the
debt-to-GDP ratio rises considerably, although the peak is somewhat higher, and the decline
more abrupt than in the data. Still, the model cannot replicate the relatively stable debt-to-
real state ratio during the house price boom, and the 20 percent jump in this ratio recorded
around 2007. The paths for GDP and the nominal interest rates implied by the model are
also at odds with the data. Initially, there is a sharp rise in GDP, accompanied by a surge
in inﬂation (not shown). The increase in GDP is driven by a boom in the consumption of
borrowers, as the collateral constraint is relaxed. At the same time, the nominal interest
rate climbs to ten percent, well outside the range of values observed in the last decade.
Following the initial boom, GDP contracts before the tightening of ﬁnancial conditions, asHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 26
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Figure 5.1. Transitions paths for alternative experimentsHOUSEHOLD LEVERAGING AND DELEVERAGING 27
lenders curtail their consumption of non-durables and services, and investment in physical
capital declines. Finally, the nominal interest rate trends down as the credit cycle unwinds,
but it remains well above the ZLB due to the asymmetric borrowing constraint.
A further problem with this calibration is that it requires assigning a considerably higher
utility of housing to borrowers than to lenders, as shown in table 2. As a consequence,
borrowers hold more real estate than lenders in steady state, which is counterfactual.
Overall, these results conﬁrm that the credit liberalization story as told by our model is
very hard to reconcile with the empirical evidence, even under fairly extreme calibrations
chosen to favor the hypothesis.
5.2. A small open economy version of the model. In our baseline model, lenders and
borrowers behave in opposite ways, and the eﬀects of changes in  on house prices and
the macroeconomy are fairly muted. Of course, the exact balance between the behavior
of borrowers and lenders depends on the assumption that domestic creditors are the only
counterpart to debtors in our closed economy. In this subsection we assess the robustness
of our results to this assumption. A simple way to do so is to study the opposite extreme
case of a small open economy version of our model without lenders.
In particular, we consider a model that deviates from our baseline along the following
dimensions: (i) The economy is populated by only one type of identical agents with a
discount factor equal to b; (ii) These agents borrow from abroad at a constant real world
interest rate calibrated to 2.9% (the steady state real interest rate in our baseline); (iii)
Goods market are competitive and prices are ﬂexible. We make the second and third
simplifying assumptions because, otherwise, we would have to explicitly model the demand
from the rest of the world and the constraints on domestic monetary policy imposed by the
open-economy environment. This framework extends the models of Mendoza (2010) and
Boz and Mendoza (2010), and resembles the model of Garriga et al. (2012).
We parameterize the model to match the same targets of our baseline calibration.6 As a
consequence, most parameter values are identical to the baseline. The main exception is the
6In principle, one could calibrate the model to match the net debt of the U.S. household sector, as in Boz
and Mendoza (2010). We do not pursue this strategy because we interpret this exercise more as a check
of the robustness of our results to relaxing the closed-economy assumption, rather than as a full-blown
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value of the initial LTV , which needs to be considerably lower (0.36) to match the debt-to-
GDP ratio in an economy populated only by borrowers.7 Given this parameterization, we
subject the model to a ﬁnancial liberalization and its reversal. In our baseline experiment
of section 4.1, if house prices did not endogenously move, the increase in the LTV from 0.85
to 0.95 would generate an increase in debt equal to 5.2% of GDP. We choose the size of the
change in  in the open economy framework to match this number.8 In this way, we can
evaluate the diﬀerential eﬀect of a ﬁnancial liberalization in a closed and open economy, in
response to a similar initial impulse to credit.
Turning to the results of the experiment, house prices increase by 3.1%. This is a more
sizable increase than in the baseline, implying a roughly 50% higher “multiplier” of debt on
house prices in the open economy. However, the reaction of house prices is still an order of
magnitude smaller than in the data. These results suggest that our baseline assumption of
a closed economy is not responsible for the muted response of house prices to a ﬁnancial
liberalization. In terms of real eﬀects, although consumption and investment expand by
roughly 2 and 10 percent during the boom, GDP actually declines by 1 percentage point.
This contraction is due to a larger current account deﬁcit owing to the cost of servicing a
higher stock of debt.
6. Conclusions
We calibrate a standard general equilibrium model with borrowers and lenders, to be
consistent with micro and macro evidence from the SCF and the Flow of Funds. When
we subject the model to a “credit liberalization” cycle, calibrated to match the evolution of
initial loan to value ratios on home mortgages in the U.S. over the 2000s, house prices barely
move. As a result, the behavior of household debt is counterfactual. On the contrary, when
we engineer a boom and bust cycle in home prices driven by changes in demand, the debt
variables move as in the data, including the spike in the debt-to-collateral ratio observed
in 2007-08, when prices collapsed. In both experiments, however, the aggregate reaction to
7There are two additional changes with respect to the baseline. First, the housing preference parameter,
b is set to 0.134 as opposed to 0.1 as in the baseline, to match the real estate-to-GDP ratio. Second, the
value of the investment adjustment cost parameter is 0.1, since we were not able to solve the model with
the original value of 2.
8Based on this criterion,  increases from 0.36 to 0.402, a 12 percent rise, exactly the same percentage
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the changes in debt tends to be small, in part because the nominal interest rate remains
far from the zero lower bound.
This evidence suggests that stories pointing to house values and their evolution as the
primary source of the credit cycle are more promising than those based on exogenous
shifts in credit availability. But either way, the limited macroeconomic impact of forced
changes in debt under both scenarios suggests that deleveraging might not be as strong
a macroeconomic force as the conventional wisdom suggests, at least within this class of
general equilibrium models.
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